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CONTRACT LAW  ARKANSAS’S UN-AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas prevailing-party statute, found in section 16-22-308 of
the Arkansas Code, is both overbroad and under-inclusive on its face and
should be repealed or, at least, limited to cases where public policy in some
way favors shifting fees.1 The law (hereinafter generally referred to as “the
prevailing-party statute”) provides that:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, statement of account,
account stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract
relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for
labor or services, or breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law
or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the prevailing
party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the
court and collected as costs.2

As written, this statute allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in almost any collection action or breach of
contract case, unless a contract clause or conflicting statute prevents such
allowance.3
The statute’s effect at the outset of litigation is both an impetus to pursue claims and a limitation on parties of limited means. A party may consider the statute a bonus to their recovery on a surefire suit for breach, but a
differently-situated party, not able to absorb the loss if they do not prevail,
may view the statute as a risk too great to bear and choose to forego their
suit. This dampening effect of the statute unnecessarily restrains unsophisticated parties’ ability to enforce contracts in the state by its simple, unguided
discretionary language.4 This is likely most impactful to unsophisticated
parties because the statute is implied in contracts that lack any express pro-

1. See infra Part III, Section A.
2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999).
3. Id. (“[U]nless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter
of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed
by the court . . . .”); see also Gafford v. Allstate Ins., 2015 Ark. 110, at 6, 459 S.W.3d 277,
280 (holding that ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208 (Repl. 2014) is a conflicting statute that must
be relied on in place of ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999) where applicable).
4. See infra Part III, Section C.
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vision regarding fee-shifting, thus exposing unsophisticated parties to costs
they did not know to exclude from the agreement.5
A remedy for this unusual situation could come in one of four forms.
First, the statute could be repealed, with the result that the common law and
pre-existing statutes would govern recovery of attorney’s fees. Second, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas could adopt judicial standards that would provide some guidance for both the trial courts administering the law and for
the appellate courts reviewing awards of fees. This option would be comparable to the Court’s guidance regarding sanctions for misconduct under the
rules of civil procedure.6 Third, the statute could be limited by legislative
action to cases involving some wrongdoing beyond simple breach of contract. This option would be a plain addition to the text similar to the addition
made in 1989.7 Fourth, the statute could be replaced with the intention that
the replacement include an explanation of the scope of the law in terms of
affected parties and a maximum amount of fees to be recovered. The replacement would also include a statement of the policy behind the law that
the Supreme Court of Arkansas could then consider in their adoption of judicial standards for review of the law. This option would bring the statute in
line with the other fee-shifting statutes of limited application, such as section 23-79-208 of the Arkansas Code (hereinafter generally referred to as
“the loss claims statute”)8 that is limited to suits involving defendant insurance companies.9
With these potential remedies as a backdrop, this note first analyzes the
various approaches to attorney’s fees in contract disputes and their effects
and effectiveness.10 Next, this note explains the scope and application of the
prevailing-party statute and provides some examples of fee-shifting rules
that include the type of standards and guidance needed in section 16-22308.11 Part III argues that the current “English Rule” style law that Arkansas
uses is, by a lack of limiting language and in the absence of standards or
guidelines, a law with no clear purpose and unpredictable results.12 Last,
Part III Sections B–D discusses other fee-shifting rules and how those may
be used as examples to change Arkansas’s.13

5. See infra Part II, Section E.
6. See infra Part III, Section B.
7. See infra Part III, Section C.
8. Referred to as such because it is titled “Damages and attorney’s fees on loss claims”
in the Arkansas Code Annotated.
9. See infra Part III, Section D.
10. See infra Part II, Section A.
11. See infra Part II, Sections B–E.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part III, Sections B–D.
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II. BACKGROUND
There are generally two approaches to the question of “who pays the
attorneys” at the end of a case. In common parlance among legal circles, the
two possibilities are known as the English Rule and the American Rule.14
While, in modern practice, the dichotomy between the American and the
English Rules is “sufficiently blurred” to render the distinction a mere useful
fiction,15 historically, the English Rule provides that the loser pays16 and the
American Rule provides that each party pays their own attorneys.17 Despite
the nomenclature, the American Rule finds both supporters and detractors
throughout American legal scholarship.18 In one camp, opponents of the rule
argue that a party should not need to resort to the professional assistance of
an attorney and the prolonged and expensive procedures of filing suit for
enforcement of their rights. And when they do need to resort to legal action,
they should be permitted to shift the cost to the wrongdoer. In the other
camp, proponents argue that a party should not be scared away from enforcing obligations by the prospect of paying the other party’s fees if things go
awry. The solution is somewhere in the middle, and courts have been working inward from either side for centuries, choosing one “rule” or the other
and carving out exceptions.19
A.

English Rule

In England, the fees paid to the barrister and many of the other expenses paid during a lawsuit are referred to collectively as “costs.”20 There was
14. John R. Schleppenbach, Winning the Battle but Losing the War: Towards A More
Consistent Approach to Prevailing Party Fee Shifting in the Contractual Context, 12 FLA. A
& M U. L. REV. 185, 188 (2017).
15. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Attorneys’ Fees in a Loser-Pays System, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1619, 1622, n.4 (2014) (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al., When Courts Determine Fees
in a System with a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1452, 1455 (2013)).
16. EIU Grp., Inc. v. Citibank Del., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 367, 369 (D. Mass. 2006)
(asserting that the “‘British Rule’—loser pays— . . . has been employed in England since the
Statute of Gloucester in 1278 . . . .”).
17. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975).
18. See, e.g., Nathan Nash, Solange Hilfinger-Pardo & James Mandilk, The Tarnished
Golden Rule: The Corrosive Effect of Federal Prevailing-Party Standards on State Reciprocal-Fee Statutes, 127 YALE L.J. 1068 (2018) (generally advocating for a broad “prevailing
party” fee-shifting rule); see also Michael Moore, Legal Malpractice and the Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule: A Suggested Approach for Addressing Intentional Lawyer
Misconduct, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1151 (1991) (arguing in support of the American
Rule that a party should not “suffer a penalty for exercising his basic right to access the judicial system”).
19. See Part II, Section B.
20. Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856 (1929).
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no allowance for costs at common law.21 However, before the development
of modern law, English statutory law began to provide means to collect
costs for prevailing parties.22 Recovery of costs was authorized by statute as
early as 1278 for plaintiffs23 and 1607 for defendants.24 The English rule has
become more and more narrowly prescribed, but is still the expectation and
remains in the discretion of the court.25 Special judges were, and still are,
used in English courts to determine the amount of reasonable costs and
fees.26 The rules for recovery of costs have grown so complicated in England, and in all the other countries following the English rule, that Mathias
Reimann calls it “hopelessly simplistic as well as virtually useless” to define
the English rule as “loser pays.”27 Some countries following this rule shift
fees in an attempt to make the winner completely whole, covering his or her
costs almost entirely and including costs of representation, fact investigation, and court fees.28 Yet, even countries in this category may limit the
amount of attorney’s fees to what the court considers reasonable.29 Other
English-rule countries, including England, generally do not shift the whole
cost, but maintain the general rule of some shifting from the winner to the
loser.30
B.

American Rule

By contrast, the rule in America generally provides that “the prevailing
party may not recover attorney’s fees as costs or otherwise.”31 This rule is
nearly as old as the United States federal court system. 32 In 1793, Congress
allowed prevailing parties to be compensated for their costs and fees, but
this statute was only renewed for a few years and expired in 1798.33 An
21. Id. at 851–52.
22. Id. at 851 (Goodhart tells us that “[t]he common-law rule as to costs is based entirely
on statute,” referring to the Statute of Gloucester, before which there was no specific provision for claiming attorney’s fees).
23. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 n.18 (1975).
24. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1993).
25. Id. at 1571.
26. Id.
27. Mathias Reimann, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Synthesis, in COST
AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3, 9 (Mathias Reimann,
ed., 2011) (ebook).
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. at 13.
31. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975).
32. See, e.g., Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (“The general
practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to it . . . .”).
33. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 248 n.19.
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1842 act of Congress gave the Supreme Court of the United States authority
to regulate the payment of costs and to prescribe the costs that are taxable to
parties.34 In 1853, Congress prescribed the costs allowable for attorneys and
numerous other persons who have business in litigation (printers, process
servers, clerks, witnesses) and specifically prohibited other compensation
(such as payment of fees by the opposing party).35 Arkansas followed the
same trend, enforcing the American rule for over a century before starting to
carve out exceptions.36
There are many exceptions to the American rules of attorney’s fees at
both state and federal levels.37 One commentator found six categories of
exceptions to the American rule in America: (1) contract provisions that
provide for fee-shifting, (2) common fund doctrine, (3) substantial benefit
doctrine, (4) contempt, (5) bad faith, and (6) statutes and rules of procedure.38 Most of these exceptions are the product of various legislative enactments that reflect the policy and perspectives of their respective states.39
These include the statute that is the subject of this note as well as a litany of
federal and state statutes too numerous to list here.40 That litany includes a
few prominent federal statutes, applicable to narrow areas of the law, that
require the award of attorney’s fees under certain circumstances: Antitrust,41

34. Id. at 250 n.23.
35. Id. at 253–254.
36. See Jacobson v. Poindexter, 42 Ark. 97, 100 (1883) (“The law makes no allowance
to the successful suitor for his time, indirect loss, annoyance or counsel fees.”). The first
statutory exception in Arkansas was not made until 1951 with the passage of section 4-56101 of the Arkansas Code, infra note 122.
37. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 254–63 (providing a frequently cited list of exceptions).
38. Vargo, supra note 24, at 1578–89.
39. See Jeffrey C. Bright, Unilateral Attorney’s Fees Clauses: A Proposal to Shift to the
Golden Rule, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 85, 114–117 (2012) (“Seven states provide reciprocal attorney fee’s statutes. These statutes reform unilateral attorney’s fees clauses to apply reciprocally towards both parties. Six other states provide limited reciprocal attorney’s fees statutes that
apply to specific types of contracts: consumer contracts, installment contracts, and residential
leases.”); see also Nash, supra note 18, at 1104 n.150 (providing a list of state statutes that
allow for recovery of attorney’s fees in particular types of cases).
40. Vargo, supra note 24, at 1588 (finding that “there are over 200 federal and almost
2,000 state” statutory exceptions).
41. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 4304(a) (West 2018) (“[I]n any claim under the antitrust
laws . . . the court shall, . . . (1) award to a substantially prevailing claimant the cost of suit
attributable to such claim, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, or (2) award to a substantially prevailing party defending against any such claim the cost of suit attributable to such
claim, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, if the claim, or the claimant’s conduct . . . was
frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith.”); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 15
(West 2018) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured . . . by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee”).
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Fair Labor Standards Act,42 Lanham Act,43 Truth in Lending,44 Merchant
Marine Act45, and Title II Civil Rights Act.46
Aside from the statutory exceptions, courts have added exceptions
based on their inherent powers and in the interest of “orderly and expeditious disposition of cases,”47 generally fitting into the bad faith and common
fund exceptions. Courts have widely recognized the bad faith exception
where a party has acted “vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”48
The common fund exception, which spreads the cost of litigation among
those benefitting from it, has been upheld by the Supreme Court.49 In exceedingly rare cases, a party may claim what has been termed the “private
attorney general” exception, similar to the common fund doctrine.50 Last, an
exception cited almost as frequently as the bad-faith exception is the exception for contempt or willful disobedience of a court order.51
These numerous examples of federal statutory and common law exceptions reflect a trend observable in Arkansas as well. The General Assembly
of the state began chipping away at the rule during the twentieth century
and, piece by piece, put together sets of laws that both reflected and deviated
from the federal procedures and statutes in meaningful ways. The prevail42. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2018) (“The court . . . shall . . . allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant . . . .”).
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (West 2018) (“The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a) (West 2018) (“[A]ny creditor who fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this part . . . is liable to such person . . . to have a right of rescission under section 1635 of this title, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court”).
45. 46 U.S.C.A. § 31304(b) (West 2018) (“If the plaintiff prevails, the court shall award
costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff.”).
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(b) (West 2018) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”).
47. EIU Grp., Inc. v. Citibank Del., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372–73 (D. Mass. 2006)
(quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31, (1962)), aff’d in part, rev’d and remanded in part, 489 F.3d 405 (1st Cir. 2007).
48. F. D. Rich Co. v. U.S. for the Use of Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129–30
(1974); see also Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 1928)
(providing a list of causes of action and classes of parties where bad faith may be found),
rev’d, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
49. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (acknowledging the possibility of recovery under the doctrine).
50. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 266 (1975) (recognizing this as an extremely limited exception, explaining that the function of a party acting as
a private attorney general is to “call public officials to account and to insist that they enforce
the law.”).
51. See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923) (“[I]t was
not an abuse of discretion in this case to impose as a penalty, compensation for the expenses
incurred by the successful party to the decree in defending its rights in the Ohio court.”). See
also infra notes 90–105 and accompanying text.

2020]

ARKANSAS’S APPROACH TO ATTORNEY’S FEES

593

ing-party statute is just one example of these exceptions but, as set out below, it is an exception that needs to be revisited.
C.

The Prevailing-Party Statute Today

The state and federal courts and legislatures, in creating the exceptions
discussed above, chipped away at the American Rule. At the same time,
they generally included explanations, limitations, or clear standards for the
reversal of the norm.52 This section explains how the prevailing-party statute
works and shows that it lacks the explanation, limitations, and standards
needed to make it effective and reasonable. The following sections then discuss the rules and statutes that should be considered models for making exceptions to the American rule.53
1.

How Section 16-22-308 Works

The statute itself does not require much parsing or extrapolation; it is
remarkably simple, containing only one sentence and no sections or organizational aids. Section 16-22-308 provides that:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, statement of account,
account stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract
relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for
labor or services, or breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law
or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the prevailing
party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the
court and collected as costs.54

The party should follow the procedure provided in Arkansas Rule of
Civil Procedure 54, and, if the party follows the procedure, it is left to the
discretion of the trial court whether to award fees and in what amount. 55
Other than the determination of reasonableness of fees,56 there is no guidance for the parties or the trial court in determining whether to allow the
fees. The statute is simple and vague; however, a review of the case law
reveals enough successful and unsuccessful attempts to recover to demonstrate the impressive scope of the prevailing-party statute.
52. Infra Part II, Sections D–E.
53. Infra Part II, Sections D–E.
54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999).
55. Id. (providing that a party “may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee.”) (emphasis
added). For an example of the need for strict compliance with Rule 54, see Roop v. Cook,
2009 Ark. App. 540, at 10–16 334 S.W.3d 412, 415–17, wherein the prevailing party lost its
chance to recover fees due to a formulaic error in their pleading.
56. See Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229, 800 S.W.2d 717, 718 (1990)
(providing factors for determining reasonableness); see also infra Section II, C.
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To What Does Section 16-22-308 Apply?

The statute, as written, is specific as to what types of agreements it affects, and it originally only covered actions for recovery on the types of
agreements explicitly listed.57 The language of the statute was expanded in
1989 by Act 800 to include breach of contract generally.58 The first formulation of the statute excluded actions for recovery on breach of contract, seemingly limiting the original statute to fee-shifting only in cases where the recovery sought was based on a liquidated or readily-ascertainable sum owed
under the agreement as opposed to losses that were difficult to measure,
such as claims for consequential damages.59
The addition of breach of contract removed that minor limitation, and
over a dozen types of agreements have been added by judicial interpretation
to the list of agreements to which the prevailing-party statute is applicable.
One preeminent scholar of contracts and damages provides the following list
of contracts to which this provision has been applied:
legal services, insurance coverage, construction and surveying services,
real property leases and sales agreements, oil and gas leases, covenants in
warranty deeds, foreclosure actions, sales agency agreements, the sale of a
business, partnership agreements, trust agreements, covenants not to compete, wrongful termination claims, employment contracts for public school
teachers, and other employment contracts. 60
An important effect of the non-limiting language of the statute is that a
party prevailing on any action that is based predominantly on a contract
claim, but includes other claims or counterclaims, can recover attorney’s
fees for the pursuit or defense of all claims. 61 For instance, in a claim based
on strict tort liability, breach of implied and express warranties, and breach
of contract, the court affirmed an award of attorney’s fees under the prevailing-party statute.62

57. First Nat’l Bank of Crossett v. Griffin, 310 Ark. 164, 174, 832 S.W.2d 816, 821
(1992).
58. Id. (“The classes of civil action to which Act 519 applies were expanded by amendment by 1989 Ark. Acts 800 which added actions for breach of contract.”).
59. This includes the labor or services clause, being that the cost of the labor or services
would have been a readily ascertainable if not an express sum in the contract.
60. HOWARD BRILL, ARKANSAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAW OF DAMAGES § 11:4, Westlaw
(2018) (footnotes omitted).
61. Kinkead v. Union Nat’l Bank, 51 Ark. App. 4, 18, 907 S.W.2d 154, 162 (1995)
(“Here, although appellants made unsubstantiated allegations of tort in their counterclaim, the
trial was basically an action for foreclosure.”).
62. Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Harlan, 2017 Ark. App. 203, at 14, 518 S.W.3d 89, 98.
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Who Is the Prevailing Party?

Though a complex lawsuit may result in favorable verdicts in each direction, for the purposes of section 16-22-308, the prevailing party is the
party who received a monetary judgment in their favor.63 In a case where the
defendant successfully moved for dismissal on six of the seven claims
against it, the defendant was still not considered the prevailing party under
section 16-22-308 because, in the end, the plaintiff still won monetary
judgment against the defendant and could therefore be awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees.64
4.

What Is a Reasonable Fee?

Many cases and many courts have dealt with the question of what constitutes a reasonable fee. No court has, or likely can, develop a definite formula for calculating reasonable attorney’s fees.65 Arkansas courts use their
own knowledge and a combination of the following eight factors set out in
Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc.:
1) the experience and ability of the attorney, 2) the time and labor required to perform the legal service properly, 3) the amount involved in
the case and the results obtained, 4) the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, 5) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services, 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, 7) the time limitations imposed upon the client or by the circumstances, and 8) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. 66

The decision of what amounts to a reasonable fee is within the discretion of the trial court and will only be upset by a higher court after a showing of abuse of discretion.67 Additionally, courts disfavor the possibility of
63. Cumberland Fin. Grp., Ltd. v. Brown Chem. Co., 34 Ark. App. 269, 273, 810
S.W.2d 49, 51 (1991) (“the party in whose favor the verdict compels a judgment is considered to be the prevailing party”).
64. ERC Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Luper, 32 Ark. App. 19, 23–24, 795 S.W.2d 362, 365
(1990) (“The basis of the argument is that six of the seven counts contained in [appellee’s]
complaint were dismissed on the appellant’s motion at the close of [appellee’s] case-inchief. . . . We agree with the view of the trial court here that the appellee was the ‘prevailing
party’ under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308.”).
65. See S. Beach Beverage Co. v. Harris Brands, Inc., 355 Ark. 347, 356, 138 S.W.3d
102, 107–08 (2003) (the court provides six cases that it had decided in the last twenty years,
each with different factors for determining a reasonable fee); see also Hensley v. Eckhart,
461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (Referring to calculation of a reasonable fee amount: “There is no
precise formula for making these determinations.”).
66. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229, 800 S.W.2d 717, 718–19 (1990).
67. Id. at 230, 800 S.W.2d at 719.
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another prolonged proceeding to determine attorney’s fees68 and so are not
likely to entertain appeals or substantial discussion of hours and expenses.
5.

When Is Section 16-22-308 Not Applicable?

The prevailing-party rule is not applicable in any situation where there
is an otherwise applicable law, a prime example being actions against an
insurance company, though the claim is based on contract.69 Because “unjust
enrichment is a quasi-contract claim” and based on a legal fiction, not an
actual contract, a party may not recover under section 16-22-308 when prevailing on an unjust enrichment claim. 70 Last, the law is not applicable when
the contract that is the subject of the action provides otherwise.71 Specifically contracting otherwise offers the only protection from exposure to paying
the prevailing/adverse party’s attorney’s fees. On the other hand, the statute
is applicable in federal courts sitting in diversity,72 and it is only applicable
to attorney’s fees on appeal if it is first raised at the trial level.73
D.

Chipping Away at the American Rule (Procedurally)

As discussed above, the twentieth century has seen the development of
several methods for collecting attorney’s fees from an opposing party. 74
These include procedures relating to the misconduct of parties during both
trial and pre-trial proceedings,75 as well as procedures for a court to award
attorney’s fees under whatever substantive laws the legislature sees fit to
provide.76 Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 11,77 30,78 33,79 37,80 and 5681
68. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (1983) (“A request for attorney’s fees should not result
in a second major litigation.”).
69. Gafford v. Allstate Ins., 2015 Ark. 110, at 6–7, 459 S.W.3d 277, 280 (“[S]ection 2379-208 provides for an insured’s exclusive means of recovering attorneys’ fees in an action to
recover for a loss under an insurance policy.”).
70. Stokes v. Stokes, 2016 Ark. 182, at 11, 491 S.W.3d 113, 121 (“Because Mason
asserted an unjust-enrichment claim, he is not entitled to attorney’s fees. Therefore, we conclude that in this case attorney’s fees are not authorized by section 16-22-308.”).
71. “[U]nless otherwise provided . . . by the contract which is the subject matter of the
action” ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999).
72. Hortica-Florists’ Mut. Ins. v. Pittman Nursery Corp., 729 F.3d 846, 852 (8th Cir.
2013), as corrected (Sept. 9, 2013) (“In a diversity case such as this one, see 28 U.S.C. §
1332, we employ state substantive law. State law governing attorneys’ fees is generally ‘substantive.’”) (citations omitted).
73. Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. v. Anderson-Martin Mach. Co., 313 Ark. 258, 272,
854 S.W.2d 321, 328 (1993) (“[W]e have held that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp.
1991) is not applicable to attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.”).
74. See supra notes 33–47 and accompanying text.
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; ARK. R. CIV. P. 11.
76. ARK. R. CIV. P. 54(e).
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provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees as a result of various types of
attorney misconduct, and Rule 54 provides the procedure for recovery.82
Rules 30, 33, and 37 apply only to discovery proceedings, Rule 56 applies
only to motions for summary judgment,83 and Rule 11 applies to any “pleading, motion, or other paper” submitted to the court.84 While Arkansas Rule
of Civil Procedure 54 provides the procedure for requesting attorney’s fees
and taxing court costs, it does not actually establish any substantive right to
request attorney’s fees.85 Instead, as a procedural rule, it is used in combination with section 16-22-308 to recover attorney’s fees.86
The broadest provision allowing for the recovery of attorney’s fees in
both the state and federal court system is Rule of Civil Procedure 11. This
rule is wielded as a bullwhip, a sword, and a shield by parties according to
their present need. It can encourage an opposing party to follow through,87

77. ARK. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (“Sanctions that may be imposed for violations of this rule
include, but are not limited to . . . (D) an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”).
78. ARK. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3) (“If the court finds that any impediment, delay, or other
conduct has frustrated the fair examination of the deponent, it may impose upon the persons
responsible an appropriate sanction, including the reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred by any parties as a result thereof.”).
79. ARK. R. CIV. P. 33 (b)(5) (“The party submitting the interrogatories may move for an
order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an interrogatory.”) ARK. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4) (providing for “payment of reasonable expenses incurred”
and the reasonable expenses include attorney’s fees).
80. ARK. R. CIV. P. 37 (providing in five places that a party who is compelled to act by
the court or who otherwise fails to act as he or she should may be ordered to pay the other
party’s “reasonable expenses” incurred by moving for the court order or “caused by the failure.”).
81. ARK. R. CIV. P. 56(g) (“Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the
party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which
the filing of the affidavit caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.”).
82. See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Swaim, 338 Ark. 49, at 60–61, 991 S.W.2d 555,
562 (1999).
83. ARK. R. CIV. P. 56 (titled “Summary judgment”).
84. ARK. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
85. Roop v. Cook, 2009 Ark. App. 540, at 10–16 334 S.W.3d 412, 415–17 (“The Roops
admit that they did not comply with Rule 54(e) in that they did not specifically mention in
their motion the statute entitling them to the award. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308.”) (prevailing parties were denied recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of failure to adhere to Rule 54
despite ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 permitting recovery).
86. ARK. R. CIV. P. 54(e).
87. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (allowing the frightening prospect of official sanction).
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punish them for failing to provide necessary information,88 or protect a party
from needless and trivial claims.89 It is the last purpose of Rule 11 that, at
first blush, appears to be the purpose behind the prevailing-party statute,
and, if that is so, what is the purpose of a duplicate remedy? The purpose of
the prevailing-party statute is not redundant and may be clearly distinguished from the federal and state Rule 11.
1.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides that a court may, upon appropriate motion, order a party to pay another party’s attorney’s fees and
other expenses resulting from the violation of Rule 11(b).90 Rule 11 attorney’s fees are always the result of misconduct of parties, and the Rule narrowly directs monetary sanctions in such a way that they are only available
when requested.91 The court may not issue monetary sanctions for violations
which the court addresses sua sponte.92 If a claim, defense, or legal contention is found to be unwarranted or frivolous, the court may not order a monetary sanction unless the court has issued a “show cause” order.93 Rule 11
sanctions do not apply to discovery, 94 and because the monetary sanctions
only apply as far as the direct results of sanctioned behavior,95 Rule 11 sanctions will not result in payment for discovery expenses. The purpose of Rule
11 is to deter misconduct rather than to compensate parties. This purpose is
gleaned from sections on the applicability of the Rule, the Rule’s recommended sanctions, and explicitly from the advisory committee’s notes.96 The
88. ARK. R. CIV. P. 11 (b)(2) (requiring “the factual contentions have evidentiary support”).
89. ARK. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law”).
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (“[T]he sanction may include . . . an order directing payment
to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees.”).
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (“[I]f imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s
fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.”); see also Methode Elecs., Inc.
v. Adam Techs., Inc., 371 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the sanction is imposed on the
court’s own motion, attorney fees cannot be awarded.”).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(B).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendments (“[T]he purpose
of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4)
(“Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The
sanction may include . . . an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation. (5) Limita-
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explanation of purpose and limitation on applicability make the federal Rule
11 reasonable and mitigate any dampening effect. Arkansas’s Rule 11 can
be described in much the same way; it is explained, limited, and reasonable
in a way that the prevailing-party statute is not.
2.

Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 11

The relevant part of Arkansas’s Rule 11 is facially similar to the federal
version, but the reporter’s notes indicate that they are “significantly different.”97 The principal differences, as relate to attorney’s fees, are notable and
not mere procedural differences, but the “primary purpose” of the sanctions
in deterring misconduct is largely the same.98 Arkansas’s Rule 11 differs in
that it requires a sanctioning court to “explain the basis for the sanction” and
explain “how a monetary sanction was determined,” if any.99 The requirement that a trial court explain the basis for the monetary sanction was adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in 1995.100 The Court admitted that
because of the lack of judicial standards for determining an appropriate
sanction, neither the trial court nor the parties had a basis for arguing in favor of or against a particular sanction amount.101 To correct this situation,
the Court adopted the federal standard of review for Rule 11 sanctions based
on the purpose of deterring “future litigation abuse.”102 The federal standard
comes from In re Kunstler103 and was adopted in whole by the Supreme
Court of Arkansas.104 This adoption of a judicial standard to be used by the
trial court, reviewing court, and the parties moving for the sanction is precisely the type of standard that could be created to improve the prevailingparty statute.105
tions on Monetary Sanctions. The court must not impose a monetary sanction . . . on its own,
unless it issued the show-cause order under Rule 11(c)(3) before voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.”).
97. ARK. R. CIV. P. 11 addition to reporter’s notes, 2015 amendment (“Other changes are
based on FED. R. CIV. P. 11, but overall this rule differs significantly from its federal counterpart.”).
98. See Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Wilson, 321 Ark. 150, at 159, 901 S.W.2d 826, 830
(1995).
99. ARK. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3).
100. Crockett, 321 Ark. at 159, 901 S.W.2d at 830–31.
101. Id. at 159, 901 S.W.2d at 831.
102. Id. at 159, 901 S.W.2d at 830.
103. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990).
104. Crockett, 321 Ark. at 159, 901 S.W.2d at 830–31 (“The trial court should consider
(1) the reasonableness of the opposing party’s attorney’s fees, (2) the minimum to deter, (3)
the ability to pay and (4) factors relating to the severity of the Rule 11 violation.”)(citing In
re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990)).
105. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999).
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Chipping Away at the American Rule (Substantively)

In addition to the new procedural rules, the Arkansas state legislature
passed several statutes during the latter half of the twentieth century providing substantive rules for the recovery of attorney’s fees at the culmination of
discrete categories of lawsuits.106 This set of exceptions to the American rule
has been expanded to include more types of claims, recovery of a greater
portion of the attorney’s fees, and recovery in broader categories of litigation.107
One fee-shifting statute that is distinct from section 16-22-308 is the
loss claims statute,108 which provides that a party who prevails against an
insurance carrier may recover both a penalty added to the amount recovered
and the amount of their attorney’s fees from the losing party.109 This statute
only allows for recovery by the insured if the insured is the plaintiff, and the
statute limits recovery based on how successful the insured is in recovering
the amount demanded in the complaint.110 The loss claims statute is, by
these limitations, a clearer enactment of the public policy than the prevailing-party statute. It counteracts the chilling effect of prolonged litigation that
may arise from suing sophisticated parties with deep pockets like insurers,
and it provides some relief for individuals who have likely incurred significant fees in pursuing enforcement of the contract they entered with the in-

106. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-56-101 (Repl. 2011) (providing that attorney’s
fees are recoverable in suit to collect on promissory note); Id. § 18-15-605 (Repl. 2015)
(providing that attorney’s fees are recoverable in suits against water companies’ condemnation actions); Id. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 2012) (dividing attorney’s fees between employer and
employee in workers’ compensation claims); Id. § 23-79-208 (Repl. 2014) (providing that
attorney’s fees are recoverable in suits against insurer); Id. § 9-12-309 (Repl. 2015) (providing that attorney’s fees are recoverable in actions for divorce); Id. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999).
107. For example, the enactment of section 16-22-308 essentially made section 4-56-101
obsolete by covering the promissory notes along with several other types of suits, and Act
800 of 1989 added breach of contract to section 16-22-308.
108. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208 (Repl. 2014).
109. Id. § 23-79-208 (a) (“(a)(1) In all cases in which loss occurs and the . . . insurance
company . . . liable therefor shall fail to pay the losses within the time specified in the policy
after demand is made, the person, firm, corporation, or association shall be liable to pay the
holder of the policy . . . in addition to the amount of the loss, twelve percent (12%) damages
upon the amount of the loss, together with all reasonable attorney’s fees for the prosecution
and collection of the loss.”).
110. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208(d)(1)–(2) (Repl. 2014) (“Recovery of less than the
amount demanded by the person entitled to recover under the policy shall not defeat the right
to the twelve percent (12%) damages and attorney’s fees provided for in this section if the
amount recovered for the loss is within twenty percent (20%) of the amount demanded or
which is sought in the suit. [I]n all cases involving a homeowner’s policy, the right to reasonable attorney’s fees provided for in this section shall arise if the amount recovered for the loss
is within thirty percent (30%) of the amount demanded or which is sought in the suit.”).
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surer.111 The public policy underlying the law is implicit in the statute because it makes apparent what is being encouraged and who the statute seeks
to protect, distinguished from the prevailing-party statute, which includes no
limiting language that would reveal its purpose.
Despite the fact that the loss claims statute applies primarily to contract
enforcement claims, the Supreme Court has held that the prevailing-party
statute is not applicable to actions by an insured against an insurer.112 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held in Gafford v. Allstate Insurance Co. that a prevailing party may not use section 16-22-308 to recover
attorney’s fees when their ultimate award from the defendant insurance
company did not meet the statutory minimum for recovery under the loss
claims statute.113
Another, earlier fee-shifting statute provides the foundation of section
16-22-308. It was the first Arkansas statute to change the common law rule
(American Rule) of no attorney’s fees: section 4-56-101 of the Arkansas
Code (hereinafter referred to generally as “the promissory note” statute).114
It provides that:
(a) A provision in a promissory note for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the amount of principal
due, plus accrued interest, for services actually rendered in accordance
with its terms is enforceable as a contract of indemnity. (b) This section
shall apply only to notes executed from and after June 7, 1951.115

The adoption of this statute explicitly allowed parties to a promissory
note executed after the date of enactment to recover attorney’s fees in a sum
equal to or less than ten percent of the amount due on the promissory note, if
the note provided for such recovery.116 This ten percent limitation applied
even if the parties had agreed to another amount, and, even when a trial
111. The fact that the statute provides a protection for the insurer/plaintiff and does not by
any means have a chilling effect is made clear by section (a)(2):
In no event will the holder of the policy or his or her assigns be liable for the attorney’s fees
incurred by the insurance company, fraternal benefit society, or farmers’ mutual aid association in the defense of a case in which the insurer is found not liable for the loss.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208 (Repl. 2014).
112. Vill. Mkt. v. State Farm Gen. Ins., 334 Ark. 227, at 229–30, 975 S.W.2d 86, 87
(1998) (“[T]he General Assembly never intended that attorney’s fees be awarded to insurers
when an insured has filed an action seeking recovery for a claim under his or her policy.”).
113. Gafford v. Allstate Ins., 2015 Ark. 110, at 6, 459 S.W.3d 277, 280 (“Thus, because
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 does not contain any such condition on a fee award, ARK.
CODE ANN. § 23-79-208 falls squarely within ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308’s exception that
it does not apply when attorneys’ fees are ‘otherwise provided by law.’”).
114. See BRILL, supra note 60 (listing this as the statute that changed the “long established rule”).
115. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-56-101 (Repl. 2011).
116. Id.
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court awarded attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, the court was not expected, much less required, to award the full ten percent.117
The promissory note statute was also discretionary,118 like the current
prevailing-party statute;119 however, it defined the scope narrowly and limited the amount of attorney’s fees based on the amount of money in controversy.120 Also, a substantial difference from the current statute was the requirement that a promissory note have some provision or clause allowing
recovery of attorney’s fees.121 The limited scope of this statute did little to
move Arkansas law away from the American Rule. Other than in promissory notes, contract clauses shifting attorney’s fees were still not enforceable
in the state until the second Griffin case in 1994 (Griffin v. First Nat’l Bank
of Crossett, hereinafter referred to as Griffin II).122
1.

Expansion of Fee-shifting with the Introduction of Section 16-22308 into Promissory Note Disputes

In First Nat’l Bank of Crossett v. Griffin (hereinafter referred to as
Griffin I), a bank sued a guarantor following the lapse of a commercial loan
for which he had given a personal guaranty.123 The bank appealed, in part,
from the lower court decision to deny its claim for attorney’s fees.124 The
bank argued that the promissory note statute permitted recovery of attorney’s fees.125 The Court did not consider this claim due to a procedural error
on the bank’s part.126 Instead the Court looked to a clause in the guaranty
agreement:
[T]he guaranty agreement provides that the guarantor agrees: “to pay all
expenses, legal and/or otherwise (including court costs and attorney’s
117. Troutt v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 280 Ark. 505, at 507, 659 S.W.2d 183, 184
(1983) (“The 10% provision is to be regarded as a ceiling on the fee allowed, at least in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances.”).
118. Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 528, at 535, 637 S.W.2d 560, 565 (1982).
119. Caplener v. Bluebonnet Mill. Co., 322 Ark. 751, at 760, 911 S.W.2d 586, 591
(1995).
120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-56-101 (Repl. 2011) (The statute only applies to promissory
notes and limits the attorney’s fees to “ten percent (10%) of the amount of the principal
due.”).
121. First Nat’l Bank of Crossett v. Griffin (Griffin I), 310 Ark. 164, at 174, 832 S.W.2d
816, 821 (1992).
122. Griffin v. First Nat’l Bank of Crossett (Griffin II), 318 Ark. 848, at 856, 888 S.W.2d
306, 311 (1994) (“We hold now such an agreement is enforceable in accordance with its
terms. This is independent of the statutory authorization providing for attorney’s fees under
the circumstances covered by ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308.”).
123. Griffin I, 310 Ark. at 167, 832 S.W.2d at 818.
124. Id. at 166–67, 832 S.W.2d at 818.
125. Id. at 173, 832 S.W.2d at 821.
126. Id., 832 S.W.2d at 821.
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fees, paid or incurred by said Bank in endeavoring to collect such indebtedness, obligations and liabilities, or any part thereof, and in enforcing this guaranty).”127

Based on this clause, the court reversed the denial of fees.128 Holding
that the recently enacted section 16-22-308 provided for recovery, the court
reasoned that “[t]his grant of authority to award such fees absent agreement
between the parties implicitly authorizes the courts to enforce such an
agreement between the parties where one exists.”129 The case was remanded
for the trial court to determine reasonable attorney’s fees but without much
direction on what services could be included in the award of attorney’s fees,
specifically whether or not the earlier bankruptcy proceedings or the future
appeals could be included in the trial court’s decision.130
In Griffin II, the bank appealed on the argument that the bank’s recovery of fees should not be limited by section 16-22-308 to the recovery on the
contract, but instead should adhere to the provision in the agreement.131 The
supreme court held that the bank was correct and that the broad language of
the guaranty agreement would be enforced “independent of the statutory
authorization,”132 allowing the bank to recover its attorney’s fees exactly as
the contract provided, including the fees incurred on appeal. As a result of
the court overturning the longstanding rule and reinterpreting the prevailingparty statute, now the law not only implies the prevailing-party provision in
every promissory note or contract entered into in the state, but will also
permit enforcement of contract provisions that are far more expansive than
the statutory allowance.133
Lastly, another significant difference between the promissory note statute and the prevailing-party statute is that the promissory-note statute was
held to be inapplicable to leases,134 though the court made it clear that the
General Assembly may change that by legislative action.135 Today, accord127. Id., 832 S.W.2d at 821.
128. Id. at 174, 832 S.W.2d at 821.
129. Griffin I, 310 Ark. at 173–74, 832 S.W.2d at 821.
130. Id. at 174, 832 S.W.2d at 821 (The instruction from the Court was limited to: “Upon
remand, the trial court should award an appropriate attorney’s fee pursuant to the agreement
of the parties.”).
131. Griffin v. First Nat’l Bank of Crossett (Griffin II), 318 Ark. 848, at 855–56, 888
S.W.2d 306, 310–11 (1994).
132. Id. at 856, 888 S.W.2d at 310–11 (“Here Griffin agreed with the Bank to pay all of
the Bank’s attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the Bank in collecting the Bearhouse
debt and in enforcing Griffin’s guaranty. We hold now such an agreement is enforceable in
accordance with its terms. This is independent of the statutory authorization providing for
attorney’s fees under the circumstances covered by Ark. Code Ann. § 16–22–308 (1994).”).
133. Griffin I, 310 Ark. at 174, 832 S.W.2d at 821.
134. See Hough v. Cont’l Leasing Corp., 275 Ark. 340, at 345, 630 S.W.2d 19, 22 (1982).
135. Id., 630 S.W.2d at 22 (“Until the General Assembly provides otherwise . . . .”).
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ing to the State legislature,136 the public policy favors the English rule in
disputes arising from basically any commercial agreement.137 Leases are
only the latest addition to the list of agreements that fall under section 1622-308 and the latest iteration of the legislature’s effort to undo the American rule.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

What can be done?

The simplest, easiest, and probably most effective response to this situation is to repeal the prevailing-party statute. Arkansas would still have the
promissory note statute, loss claims statute, and the procedural rules, but
these are less problematic due to their limitations described above. A repeal
of the prevailing-party statute would not prevent parties from contracting to
shift attorney’s fees as they wished. Most contracts could still include a provision for attorney’s fees to be paid to the prevailing party if the parties
agreed at the outset to include such a provision in the agreement, and this
agreement would be enforced under Griffin II, which did not limit its holding based on section 16-22-308.138 Barring this outcome, there are a few
alternatives to repeal: creation of judicial standards,139 rewriting the statute
to express a purpose,140 or rewriting the statute with some limitations to protect unsophisticated parties from surprise and oppression.141
B.

Cases Interpreting Section 16-22-308, or the Need for Judicial Standards

Here lies the crux of the issue with the prevailing-party statute: there
have been no official interpretations of section 16-22-308 that address what
factors a court should consider when determining whether or not to order
attorney’s fees. Many cases interpreting the statute are brought to appeal on
the issue of determining who the prevailing party was or determining
whether the statute encompasses the underlying claims. 142 Some cases have
136. Brewer v. Poole, 362 Ark. 1, at 16, 207 S.W.3d 458, 467 (2005) (“[T]he General
Assembly establishes public policy.”).
137. See supra note 58.
138. See Griffin v. First Nat’l Bank of Crossett (Griffin II), 318 Ark. 848, at 856, 888
S.W.2d 306, 311 (1994).
139. Infra Part III, Section B.
140. Infra Part III, Section C.
141. Infra Part III, Section D.
142. See, e.g., In re Hunter, 203 B.R. 150, 151 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996) (holding that a
creditor may recover attorney’s fees under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 in a bankruptcy
proceeding); Marcum v. Wengert, 344 Ark. 153, at 163, 40 S.W.3d 230, 237 (2001) (revers-
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merited an appeal and a higher court’s opinion on the question of a reasonable fee, but superior courts are more likely to review these issues on appeal
precisely because the superior courts have promulgated a standard of review
for issues of reasonableness.143 Without any standard on which to evaluate
discretion of when to award fees, almost any reasonable fee award could be
considered to be within a court’s discretion.
Similar standards could be adopted for the application of this law as
those that were adopted for Rule 11, requiring explanation by the trial
court,144 or Rule 56, requiring a finding of bad-faith.145 Or limitations could
be adopted similar to the loss claims statute, limited in scope to certain types
of parties,146 and the promissory note statute, limited by a maximum fee
amount relative to the amount in controversy.147
C.

Finding a Purpose
1.

When Should It Be Applied?

Another possible revision for the prevailing-party statute is to change
the nature of the claims to which it applies. The law does not apply to several causes of action that should be thought of as forms of wrongful conduct,
intentional misconduct, or acts in bad faith stemming from the entrance into
a contract or resulting in a breach of contract.148 Causes of action that stem
from intentional misconduct on the part of one of the contracting parties
would lead a reasonable person to agree that the party responsible for the
intentional misconduct should bear the burden of the other party’s attorney’s
fees incurred in enforcing their rights. This line of thought resembles that
behind the availability of punitive or exemplary damages.149 With damages
that go beyond what is necessary for a party to be made whole again, a decision maker is essentially saying that the conduct of the losing party is such
ing trial court determination that there was no prevailing party); Murchie v. Hinton, 41 Ark.
App. 84, at 88, 848 S.W.2d 436, 438 (1993) (holding that a warranty deed is a type of contract, so a party may recover attorney’s fees under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 in a suit to
enforce a deed covenant).
143. See S. Beach Beverage Co. v. Harris Brands, Inc., 355 Ark. 347, at 356, 138 S.W.3d
102, 107–08 (2003) (“This court discussed the criteria to examine in determining whether
attorney’s fees are reasonable,” followed by much discussion of what constitutes an evaluation of reasonableness).
144. ARK. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3).
145. ARK. R. CIV. P. 56(g).
146. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208(a) (Repl. 2014).
147. Id. § 4-56-101 (Repl. 2011).
148. These are both causes of action sounding in tort, and so section 16-22-308 does not
apply.
149. HOWARD W. BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAW OF
DAMAGES § 9.1, Westlaw (2018).
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that the party should be punished or that the party should be made an example of to deter like-minded parties.150 The problem with relying on punitive
damages in these cases is that, while the courts have been relaxing the restrictions on punitive damages in contract cases,151 there are still fairly broad
limitations on them.152 In addition, where the plaintiff in a suit may rely on
theories of contract and tort, and the tort claims allow punitive damages,
“the plaintiff must specifically plead and prove” the tort claims to recover
punitive damages.153 To allow punitive damages in contract claims or to
suggest blurring the line between contract and tort recovery would be an
overreach, but it is reasonable to limit the exception to the American rule to
claims founded on bad faith or intentional misconduct.
This would change the statute to something similar to the Rule 11 sanctions discussed above.154 In the contract enforcement analogue to Rule 11,
the court would be required to make a determination of fact as to whether
the losing party acted in bad faith or otherwise intentionally engaged in misconduct. Intentional conduct by definition would require a scienter element,
but a bad faith sanction under a revised prevailing-party statute could also
include a scienter requirement. The bad faith breach may be defined as an
intent to avoid a duty imposed by the contract “without a good-faith defense,”155 a formulation similar to that used in bad faith insurance tort doctrine in Arkansas.156 Examples of bad faith would include dishonesty, coercion, and oppressiveness, as well as more severe cases of “hatred, ill will, or
a spirit of revenge” in avoiding a duty.157 This definition of bad faith can be
distinguished from the bad faith addressed by Rule 11 because here the bad
faith does not arise in the pursuit or delay of litigation, but occurred before
the litigation and is a substantive part of the claim.
A narrow formulation of this type would substantially undo the reversal
of the American rule but would not eliminate the option of including a feeshifting provision in contracts allowed by Griffin II.158 Parties could still
150. Id.
151. Id. at § 9.3.
152. Id.
153. Id.; compare L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 282 Ark. 6, at 9, 665 S.W.2d 278,
281 (1984) (“A plaintiff should either plead and prove his cause of action in contract or in
tort.”), with DWB, LLC v. D & T Pure Tr., 2018 Ark. App. 283, 550 S.W.3d 420, reh’g
denied (June 6, 2018) (allowing a plaintiff to plead both contract and tort actions and recover
punitive damages, but the tort was conversion and not a business tort).
154. See supra Part II, Section D.
155. Ark. Model Jury Instruction 2304 (2018).
156. Nathan Price Chaney, A Survey of Bad Faith Insurance Tort Cases in Arkansas, 64
ARK. L. REV. 853, 859 (2011).
157. Id.
158. Griffin v. First Nat’l Bank of Crossett (Griffin II), 318 Ark. 848, at 856, 888 S.W.2d
306, 311 (1994).
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decide at the outset of the agreement whether they prefer the American or
English rule. These rules would not interfere because a finding of bad faith
will never lie with the prevailing party. Instead, parties would be allowed to
include a fee-shifting clause if they wanted one, but would only otherwise
be ordered to pay the prevailing party’s fees in a situation where the prevailing party proved bad faith before moving for fees. The inclusion of a requirement of bad-faith would thus reframe the prevailing-party statute to
give it a purpose of sanctioning the conduct of the losing party. This would
be an effective means of correcting the overbroad application of the statute.
The General Assembly is free to do so, and it may decide to do so, but the
repeal option is preferred as a simpler approach to the problem.
The bad faith option invites at least one argument in favor of the statute
as it is written: encouraging representation of consumers in defending suits
brought by lenders or credit-holders.159 This argument is fairly simple and
was borne out, in part, in Florida.160 There, a fee-shifting statute makes any
contract “provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is
required to take any action to enforce the contract” a reciprocal fee provision
at the discretion of the court.161 This means that even though the parties only
agreed that the holder of a note may recover attorney’s fees in a suit to collect on the note, the borrower may also recover fees if he or she prevails in
defending the suit based on a reciprocal clause implied by the statute.162 The
effect of the statute is that attorneys have been more likely to represent defendants in foreclosure, consumer debt, and landlord-tenant lawsuits because of the possibility of collecting their fees from the plaintiff after a successful defense.163 The same argument may be made for Arkansas’s prevailing-party statute, that it works both ways and may allow claims to be
brought or defenses to be raised that otherwise would be too costly for that
party.
D.

A Statute of Limited Scope
1.

The Real Problem—Implying Fee-Shifting Provisions

Another counterargument, in favor of the statute, is that a statute implying fee-shifting into contracts discourages pursuit of lower quality
claims.164 The argument makes sense at a superficial level, because it seems
159. Nash et al., supra note 18, at 1077.
160. Id. at n.42.
161. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (LexisNexis 2019).
162. Id.
163. Nash et al., supra note 18, at n.42.
164. James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J. L. & ECON. 225, 248 (1995) (conclud-
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that the defendant will potentially have to pay more than the plaintiff
claimed and so will offer a better settlement. But, of course, the plaintiff will
also have to consider that he may have to pay the defendant’s fees if he loses, inclining the plaintiff to accept a lower settlement rather than run that
risk. Add to this the uncertain duration of the litigation and the uncertainty
of jury awards. At this point, the preceding discussion is still a very superficial analysis. Several well-recognized scholars of law and economics have
not been able to agree on whether the English rule does or does not encourage settlement or whether it does or does not reduce litigation costs.165 Because the only consensus is that it is difficult to determine how parties will
act when faced with the two options in real-world cases, the counterargument of encouraging settlement with the English rule should not be given
much weight without some strong evidence in support.
Because there is not much agreement about the conclusion that feeshifting encourages settlement, that argument in favor of the prevailingparty statute should not be enough to allow it to change the content of every
contract in Arkansas. The statute not only forces sophisticated parties to
contract back into the default rule, but potentially forces unsophisticated
parties to suffer a contract provision they never knew existed. It is far more
important to avoid surprising these parties with a potentially expensive and
oppressive contract term, than to use economic theories to attempt to dissuade them from using the courts to settle their claim.
2.

Beyond the Jurisdiction – Do You Know if Anyone Else Does
This?

A few other states have similar fee-shifting statutes.166 Texas’s statute
is as simple as Arkansas’s, providing that “a person may recover reasonable
ing that the English rule increased settlement and verdict amounts because it reduced the
likelihood of plaintiffs pursuing “low-award claims”).
165. Compare John Donohue, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can’t
Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991) (pointing out that
Posner and Shavell’s work does not account for parties contracting to shift fees after the
breach has occurred and concluding that the jurisdictions fee rule does not make a difference); with Charles R. Plott, Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American and English Rules, 3
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 185, 192 (1987) (arguing that the American rule reduces fees); and A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Does the English Rule Discourage LowProbability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 519, 519 (1998) (answering the
title’s question in the negative).
166. See Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (2019) (West)); Delaware (DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 4344 (West 2019)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.48 (West 2019)); Idaho
(IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120 (West 2019)); Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1510
(West 2019)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-48 (West 2019)); Oklahoma (OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 176 (West 2019)); Pennsylvania (41 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §
503 (West 2019)); Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2019)).
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attorney’s fees . . . if the claim is for . . . an oral or written contract.”167 Delaware similarly allows for award of attorney’s fees, but without discretion
from the trial court.168 Delaware’s statute interestingly adds that the defendant shall be considered the prevailing party “if the defendant tendered to the
plaintiff the full amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, and . . . deposits in
the court . . . the amount so tendered.”169 Oklahoma’s statute limits the scope
to liens, but provides that the prevailing party “shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney’s fee” with no discretionary language or express purpose.170 These three states have fee-shifting rules that are similar to Arkansas’s in their overbroad striking of the American rule. However, the statutes
of interest here are the ones that provide for fee-shifting but limit the application in a reasonable way. This rule is found in Arizona.
Arizona’s prevailing-party statute provides that “[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract . . . the court may award the successful party
reasonable attorney fees” and then includes a provision that deems the losing party to be the prevailing party if the losing party made an offer of settlement and the judgment came out “equal to or more favorable” to the offeror than the settlement offer.171 This is similar to Arkansas’s statute, with a
twist regarding prior settlement offers, but the next clause provides Arizona’s purpose, “to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish
a just claim or a just defense.”172 This statement of purpose provides something for the courts to consider when making their decisions of whether to
award attorney’s fees and for how much. However, this statute only serves
as an example of a statute with a stated purpose. The purpose statement of
an Arkansas statute should be the inverse of Arizona’s. A party should only
be awarded attorney’s fees in order to mitigate the expense of defending
against an unjust claim or pursuing a claim wherein the defendant has no
meritorious defenses. This phrasing establishes a greater burden for the party requesting attorney’s fees and avoids the effect of punishing claimants
who brought meritorious claims but lost.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though very few cases reach a final judgment, the prospect of being on
the hook for attorney’s fees after litigation is yet another means to encourage settlement of what may be meritorious claims. Settlement of claims
without resorting to litigation is considered a valid public policy, but the
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2019).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 4344 (West 2019).
Id.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 176 (West 2019).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (West 2019).
Id.
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settlement of claims should be based on valuation of the claims and likelihood of success, not fear of adding undetermined attorney’s fees to the
claim amounts. The prevailing-party, or fee-shifting, statute as presently
written presents an unpredictable and, at times, unfair means of extracting
further payment from the losing party. The legislature has proclaimed as the
public policy of the state that parties should have the opportunity to request
fees and that judges have the discretion to award them, but without any limitations other than “reasonableness” on the award and amount of fees. While
the American rule may not be “strictly correct in principle,”173 it is this
note’s contention that the English rule could be described in exactly the
same way. A strong argument174 has already been made in favor of creation
of another statute to protect residential landlords and tenants from the
chilling effects of section 16-22-308, but that note stopped short of the
reformation necessary to correct this abrogation of the American rule. The
best reform would be for the Assembly to repeal this statute. Short of that,
the Assembly should replace the statute with one that limits the scope by
limiting the applicable parties, limiting application to bad faith breach, or
setting out a purpose mitigating expense. Failing all else, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas should at least define some standard for when attorney’s fees
should or should not be awarded.
Michael J. Berry

173. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
174. Stephanie Mantell, Note, Fee-Shifting Statutes and Landlord-Tenant Law-A Call for
the Repeal of the English Rule “Loser Pays” System Regarding Contract Disputes and Its
Effect on Low-Income Arkansas Tenants, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 105, 121 (2016)
(“In order to provide the greatest possible access to the court system to low-income tenants,
Arkansas should institute a new exception to the American Rule that would protect lowincome individuals.”).
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